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Prologue
When people hear the phrase “human rights,” they
think of the highest moral precepts and political ideals. And they are
right to do so. They have in mind a familiar set of indispensable lib-
eral freedoms, and sometimes more expansive principles of social
protection. But they also mean something more. The phrase implies
an agenda for improving the world, and bringing about a new one in
which the dignity of each individual will enjoy secure international
protection. It is a recognizably utopian program: for the political
standards it champions and the emotional passion it inspires, this
program draws on the image of a place that has not yet been called
into being. It promises to penetrate the impregnability of state bor-
ders, slowly replacing them with the authority of international law. It
prides itself on offering victims the world over the possibility of a
better life. It pledges to do so by working in alliance with states when
possible, but naming and shaming them when they violate the most
basic norms. Human rights in this sense have come to deﬁne the
most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political en-
tities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.
It is striking to register how recently this program became wide-
spread. Over the course of the 1970s, the moral world of Westerners
shifted, opening a space for the sort of utopianism that coalesced in
an international human rights movement that had never existed be-
fore. The eternal rights of man were proclaimed in the era of Enlight-
enment, but they were so profoundly different in their practical out-
comes—up to and including bloody revolution—as to constitute
another conception altogether. In 1948, in the aftermath of World
War II, a Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed.
But it was less the annunciation of a new age than a funeral wreath
laid on the grave of wartime hopes. The world looked up for a mo-
ment. Then it resumed its postwar agendas, which had crystallized in
the same years that the United Nations—which sponsored the decla-
ration—emerged. The priority fell on victory of one or the other of
the two global Cold War visions for America, the Soviet Union, and
the European continent they were dividing between them. And the
struggle for the decolonization of empire made the Cold War com-
petition global, even if some new states strove to ﬁnd some exit from
the Cold War rivalry to chart their own course. The United States,
which had driven the inﬂation of global hopes during World War II
for a new order after it, and introduced the idea of “human rights”
into minor circulation, soon dropped the phrase. And both the So-
viet Union and anticolonialist forces were more committed to collec-
tive ideals of emancipation—communism and nationalism—as the
path into the future, not individual rights directly, or their enshrine-
ment in international law.
Even in 1968, which the UN declared “International Human
Rights Year,” such rights remained peripheral as an organizing con-
cept and almost nonexistent as a movement. The UN organized a
twentieth-anniversary conference in Tehran, Iran, to remember and
revive stillborn principles. It was an extraordinary scene. The dicta-
torial shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, opened the spring conference
by crediting his ancient countrymen with the discovery of human
rights: the tradition of the great Persian emperor Cyrus of more than
a millennium before, the shah asserted, had now found fulﬁllment in
his own dynasty’s respect for moral principle. The meetings that fol-
lowed, chaired by his sister Princess Ashraf, brought to the fore an in-
terpretation of human rights altogether unrecognizable now: the lib-
eration of nations formerly under imperial rule was presented as the
most signiﬁcant achievement so far, the outcome of the long march
of human rights, and the model for what had yet to be accom-
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plished—not least in Israel, which received withering attention in the
proceedings, due to its acquisitions after the Six Day War against its
Arab neighbors. Yet outside the UN in 1968, human rights had not
yet become a powerful set of ideals, and this fact is more crucial than
anything that went on at the shah’s staged event.1 As the conference
went through its scripted motions, the real world was exploding in
revolt. May 1968 brought to Paris its greatest postwar upheaval, with
students and workers shutting the country down and demanding
an end to middle-class compromises. In far-ﬂung spots around the
globe, from Eastern Europe to China, and across the United States,
from Berkeley to New York, people—especially young people—
demanded change. But outside Tehran, no one in the global disrup-
tion of 1968 thought of the better world they demanded as a world to
be governed by “human rights.”
The drama of human rights, then, is that they emerged in the
1970s seemingly from nowhere. If the Soviet Union had generally lost
credibility (and America’s Vietnamese adventure invited so much
international outrage), human rights were not the immediate ben-
eﬁciaries. During the 1960s crisis of superpower order, other utopian
visions prospered. They called for community at home, redeeming
the United States from hollow consumerism, or “socialism with a
human face” in the Soviet empire, or further liberation from a so-
called neocolonialism in the third world. At the time, there were next
to no nongovernmental organizations that pursued human rights;
Amnesty International, a ﬂedging group, remained practically un-
known. From the 1940s until 1968, the few NGOs that did view hu-
man rights as part of their mission struggled for them within the
UN’s framework, but the conference in Tehran conﬁrmed the ago-
nizing fruitlessness of this project. One longtime NGO chief, Moses
Moskowitz, observed bitterly in the aftermath of the conference that
the human rights idea had “yet to arouse the curiosity of the intellec-
tual, to stir the imagination of the social and political reformer and
to evoke the emotional response of the moralist.”2 He was right.
Yet, within one decade, human rights would begin to be invoked
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across the developed world and by many more ordinary people than
ever before. Instead of implying colonial liberation and the creation
of emancipated nations, human rights most often now meant indi-
vidual protection against the state. Amnesty International became
newly visible and, as a beacon of new ideals, won the Nobel Peace
Prize in 1977 for its work. The popularity of its new mode of advo-
cacy forever transformed what it meant to agitate for humane causes,
and spawned a new brand and age of internationalist citizen ad-
vocacy. Westerners left the dream of revolution behind—both for
themselves and for the third world they had once ruled—and
adopted other tactics, envisioning an international law of human
rights as the steward of utopian norms, and as the mechanism of
their fulﬁllment. Even politicians, most notably American president
Jimmy Carter, started to invoke human rights as the guiding ratio-
nale of the foreign policy of states. And most visibly of all, the public
relevance of human rights skyrocketed, as measured by the simple
presence of the phrase in the newspaper, ushering in the current su-
premacy of human rights. Having been almost never used in English
prior to the 1940s, when they experienced only a modest increase, the
words “human rights” were printed in 1977 in the New York Times
nearly ﬁve times as often as in any prior year in that publication’s his-
tory. The moral world had changed. “People think of history in the
long term,” Philip Roth says in one of his novels, “but history, in fact,
is a very sudden thing.”3 Never has this been truer than when it
comes to the history of human rights.
There is no way to reckon with the recent emergence and con-
temporary power of human rights without focusing on their utopian
dimension: the image of another, better world of dignity and respect
that underlies their appeal, even when human rights seem to be
about slow and piecemeal reform. But far from being the sole ideal-
ism that has inspired faith and activism in the course of human
events, human rights emerged historically as the last utopia—one
that became powerful and prominent because other visions im-
ploded. Human rights are only a particular modern version of the
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ancient commitment by Plato and Deuteronomy—and Cyrus—to
the cause of justice. Even among modern schemes of freedom and
equality, they are only one among others; they were far from the ﬁrst
to make humanity’s global aspirations the central focus. Nor are hu-
man rights the only imaginable rallying cry around which to build a
grassroots popular movement. As Moses Moskowitz so well under-
stood on the brink of their ascendancy, human rights would have to
win or lose on the terrain of the imagination, ﬁrst and foremost. And
for them to win, others would have to lose. In the realm of thinking,
as in that of social action, human rights are best understood as survi-
vors: the god that did not fail while other political ideologies did. If
they avoided failure, it was most of all because they were widely un-
derstood as a moral alternative to bankrupt political utopias.
Historians in the United States started writing the history of hu-
man rights a decade ago. Since that time, a new ﬁeld has crystallized
and burgeoned. Almost unanimously, contemporary historians have
adopted a celebratory attitude toward the emergence and progress
of human rights, providing recent enthusiasms with uplifting back-
stories, and differing primarily about whether to locate the true break-
through with the Greeks or the Jews, medieval Christians or early
modern philosophers, democratic revolutionaries or abolitionist he-
roes, American internationalists or antiracist visionaries. In recasting
world history as raw material for the progressive ascent of interna-
tional human rights, they have rarely conceded that earlier history
left open diverse paths into the future, rather than paving a single
road toward current ways of thinking and acting. And in studying
human rights more recently, once they did come on the scene, histo-
rians have been loathe to regard them as only one appealing ideology
among others. Instead, they have used history to conﬁrm their inevi-
table rise rather than register the choices that were made and the ac-
cidents that happen. A different approach is needed to reveal the true
origins of this most recent utopian program.
Historians of human rights approach their subject, in spite of its
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novelty, the way church historians once approached theirs. They re-
gard the basic cause—much as the church historian treated the
Christian religion—as a saving truth, discovered rather than made in
history. If a historical phenomenon can be made to seem like an an-
ticipation of human rights, it is interpreted as leading to them in
much the way church history famously treated Judaism for so long,
as a proto-Christian movement simply confused about its true des-
tiny. Meanwhile, the heroes who are viewed as advancing human
rights in the world—much like the church historian’s apostles and
saints—are generally treated with uncritical wonderment. Hagiogra-
phy, for the sake of moral imitation of those who chase the ﬂame, be-
comes the main genre. And the organizations that ﬁnally appear
to institutionalize human rights are treated like the early church: a
ﬂedgling, but hopefully universal, community of believers struggling
for good in a vale of tears. If the cause fails, it is because of evil; if it
succeeds, it is not by accident but because the cause is just. These ap-
proaches provide the myths that the new movement wants or needs.
They match a public and politically consequential consensus
about the sources of human rights. Human rights commonly appear
in journalistic commentary and in political speeches as a cause both
age-old and obvious. At the latest, both historians and pundits focus
on the 1940s as the crucial era of breakthrough and triumph. High-
proﬁle observers—Michael Ignatieff, for example—see human rights
as an old ideal that ﬁnally came into its own as a response to the Ho-
locaust, which might be the most universally repeated myth about
their origins. In the 1990s, an era of ethnic cleansing in southeastern
Europe and beyond during which human rights took on literally mil-
lennial appeal in the public discourse of the West, it became com-
mon to assume that, ever since their birth in a moment of post-
Holocaust wisdom, human rights embedded themselves slowly but
steadily in humane consciousness in what amounted to a revolution
of moral concern. In a euphoric mood, many people believed that se-
cure moral guidance, born out of shock about the Holocaust and
nearly incontestable in its premises, was on the verge of displacing
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interest and power as the foundation of international society. All this
fails to register that, without the transformative impact of events in
the 1970s, human rights would not have become today’s utopia, and
there would be no movement around it.
An alternative history of human rights, with a much more recent
timeline, looks very different than conventional approaches. Rather
than attributing their sources to Greek philosophy and monotheistic
religion, European natural law and early modern revolutions, horror
against American slavery and Adolf Hitler’s Jew-killing, it shows that
human rights as a powerful transnational ideal and movement have
distinctive origins of a much more recent date. True, rights have long
existed, but they were from the beginning part of the authority of the
state, not invoked to transcend it. They were most visible in revolu-
tionary nationalism through modern history—until “human rights”
displaced revolutionary nationalism. The 1940s later turned out to be
crucial, not least for the Universal Declaration they left behind, but it
is essential to ask why human rights failed to interest many people—
including international lawyers—at the time or for decades. In real
history, human rights were peripheral to both wartime rhetoric and
postwar reconstruction, not central to their outcome. Contrary to
conventional assumptions, there was no widespread Holocaust con-
sciousness in the postwar era, so human rights could not have been a
response to it. More important, no international rights movement
emerged at the time. This alternative history is forced, therefore, to
take as its main challenge understanding why it was not in the mid-
dle of the 1940s but in the middle of the 1970s that human rights
came to deﬁne people’s hopes for the future as the foundation of an
international movement and a utopia of international law.
The ideological ascendancy of human rights in living memory
came out of a combination of separate histories that interacted in an
unforeseeable explosion. Accident played a role, as it does in all hu-
man events, but what mattered most of all was the collapse of prior
universalistic schemes, and the construction of human rights as a
persuasive alternative to them. On the threshold is the United Na-
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tions, which introduced human rights but had to be bypassed as the
concept’s essential institution for it to matter. In the 1940s, the UN
arose as a concert of great powers that refused to break in principle
with either sovereignty or empire. From the beginning, it was as re-
sponsible for the irrelevance of human rights as for their itemization
as a list of entitlements. And the emergence of new states through
decolonization, earth-shattering in other respects for the organiza-
tion, changed the meaning of the very concept of human rights but
left them peripheral on the world stage. It was, instead, only in the
1970s that a genuine social movement around human rights made its
appearance, seizing the foreground by transcending ofﬁcial govern-
ment institutions, especially international ones.
To be sure, there were a number of catalysts for the explosion:
the search for a European identity outside Cold War terms; the re-
ception of Soviet and later East European dissidents by politicians,
journalists, and intellectuals; and the American liberal shift in foreign
policy in new, moralized terms, after the Vietnamese disaster. Equally
signiﬁcant, but more neglected, were the end of formal colonialism
and the crisis of the postcolonial state, certainly in the eyes of West-
ern observers. The best general explanation for the origins of this so-
cial movement and common discourse around rights remains the
collapse of other, prior utopias, both state-based and internationalist.
These were belief systems that promised a free way of life, but led
into bloody morass, or offered emancipation from empire and cap-
ital, but suddenly came to seem like dark tragedies rather than bright
hopes. In this atmosphere, an internationalism revolving around in-
dividual rights surged, and it did so because it was deﬁned as a pure
alternative in an age of ideological betrayal and political collapse. It
was then that the phrase “human rights” entered common parlance
in the English language. And it is from that recent moment that hu-
man rights have come to deﬁne the present day.
To give up church history is not to celebrate a black mass instead. I
wrote this book out of intense interest in—even admiration for—the
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contemporary human rights movement, the most inspiring mass
utopianism Westerners have had before them in recent decades. For
today’s utopians, it is surely the place to start. But especially for those
who feel their powerful appeal, human rights have to be treated as
a human cause, rather than one with the long-term inevitability
and moral self-evidence that common sense assumes. Understanding
better how human rights came to the world in the midst of a crisis of
utopianism reveals not simply their historical origins but their con-
temporary situation much more thoroughly than other approaches.
For their emergence in an age when other, previously more appealing
utopias died came at a very high price.
The true history of human rights matters most of all, then, in or-
der to confront their prospects today and in the future. If they do
capture many longstanding values, it is equally critical to understand
more honestly how and when human rights took shape as a wide-
spread and powerful set of aspirations for a better and more hu-
mane world. After all, they have done far more to transform the ter-
rain of idealism than they have the world itself. In and through their
emergence as the last utopia after predecessors and rivals collapsed,
the movement’s most difﬁcult quandaries were already set. Though
they were born as an alternative to grand political missions—or even
as a moral criticism of politics—human rights were forced to take on
the grand political mission of providing a global framework for the
achievement of freedom, identity, and prosperity. They were forced,
slowly but surely, to assume the very maximalism they triumphed by
avoiding.
This contemporary dilemma is what has to be faced squarely, yet
history as celebration of origins will not help in doing so. Few things
that are powerful today turn out on inspection to be longstanding
and inevitable. And the human rights movement is certainly not one
of them. But this also means that human rights are not so much an
inheritance to preserve as an invention to remake—or even leave be-
hind—if their program is to be vital and relevant in what is already a
very different world than the one into which it came so recently. No
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one knows yet for sure, in light of the inspiration they provide and
the challenges they face, what kind of better world human rights can
bring about. And no one knows whether, if they are found wanting,
another utopia can arise in the future, just as human rights once
emerged on the ruins of their predecessors. Human rights were born
as the last utopia—but one day another may appear.
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